第29章：Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms & Estates 论邦国底真正伟大之处（中英对照）

培根散文随笔集中英对照，通过阅读文学名著学语言，是掌握英语的绝佳方法。既可接触原汁原味的英语，又能享受文学之美，一举两得，何乐不为？
29 of the true greatness of kingdoms & estates 论邦国底真正伟大之处
the speech of themistocles the athenian, which was haughty and arrogant, in taking so much to himself, had been a grave and wise observation and censure, applied at large to others. desired at a feast to touch a lute, he said; he could not fiddle, but yet he could make a small town, a great city. these words (holpen a little with a metaphor) may express two differing abilities, in those mat deal in business of estate. for if a true survey be taken, of counsellors and statesmen, there may be found (though rarely) those which can make a small state great and yet cannot fiddle: as on the other side, there will be found a great many, that can fiddle very cunningly, but yet are so far from being able to make a small state great as their gift lieth the other way; to bring a great and flourishing estate to ruin and decay. and certainly, those degenerate arts and shifts, whereby many counsellor and governors gain both favour with their masters, and estimation with the vulgar, deserve no better name then fiddling; being things rather pleasing for the time, and graceful to themselves only, than tending to the weal and advancement of the state which they serve.
雅典人塞密斯陶克立斯在某次宴会上有人想请他弹琵琶。他说他不会弄琴可是会把一个小城弄成一座大邦。这句话因为过于归功自己，所以是骄傲不逊；但是如果一般地用在别人身上，则可算是很庄肃贤明的评论。这句话（再用譬喻底说法引申一下）就可以把从事国政者之中两种不同的才能表现出来。因为，如果把议事和执政的各官真正地观察一下，其中也许可以发见（虽然这是很稀有的）几个能使小国变为大邦，而不能弄琴的人；同时，在另一方面，却可以发现许多巧于弄琴可是不但不能使小国变为大邦，而且是有相反的天才的人，他们是能把一个伟大而兴盛的国家带到衰败凋零的地步的。并且，那些堕落的技巧智能，许多公卿大夫借之以邀宠于主上钓名于流俗者，确是除了“弄琴”之名，不值得更好的名称的：因为这些技巧智能不过是一时欢乐之资，在会者本人虽可借以炫耀，而于他们所事的国家之幸福与进步，则无所裨益也。

there are also (no doubt) counsellor and governors, which may be held sufficient (negotus pares), able to manage affairs, and to keep them from precipices and manifest inconveniences; which nevertheless, are far from the ability to raise and amplify an estate, in power, means, and fortune. but be the workmen what they may be, let us speak of the work; that is, the true greatness of kingdoms and estates; and the means thereof. an argument, fit for great and mighty princes to have in their hand; to the end, that neither by over-measuring their forces, they lose themselves in vain enterprises; nor on the other side, by undervaluing them, they descend to fearful and pusillanimous counsels.
当然，也有些公卿大夫够得上一个“能”字的（即所谓“干才”）。他们能够调理国政，不使陷于危难和明显的困境，可是若要把国家在力量，财富，国运上都增强长大，则他们断断无此能力。现在我们不管做事的人怎么样，且一谈事务底本身；就是，国家底真正伟大之处以及达到这种情形的方法。这是一个值得雄王英主常常考虑的题目；为的是他们既可以不至于因为过于相信自己底力量而多事妄为，虚耗实力；又可以不至于因为过于卑视自己底力量而屈尊以从怯懦畏葸的计议也。

the greatness of an estate in bulk and territory doth fall under measure; and the greatness of finances and revenue doth fall under computation. the population may appear by musters: and the number and greatness of cities and towns, by cards and maps. but yet there is not anything amongst civil affairs more subject to error, than the right valuation, and true judgement,
concerning the power and forces of an estate.
一个国家底疆土之大小是可以测量的；其财赋收入之多少是可以计算的。它底人口可由户口册卷而得见，城镇之多少及大小则可由图表而知之。然而在人事中没有比关于一国底力量的真正估计推断更为易于错误的。
the kingdom of heaven is compared, not to any great kernel or nut, but to a grain of mustard-seed; which is one of the least grains, but hath in it a property and spirit, hastily to get up and spread. so are there states, great in territory, and yet not apt to enlarge, or command; and some, that have but a small dimension of stem, and yet apt to be the foundations of great monarchies.
基督把天国不譬做任何巨大的果核或种子而譬做一粒芥子；即是一种最小的种子，但是却有一种迅速发芽及长大底特性与精神。类此，有些国家底疆土很大，可是不能伸张国力或领袖他国；又有些国家幅员很小，有如一种躯干微小的植物，然而却能为强大的帝国之基础

walled towns, stored arsenals and armouries, goodly races of horse, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery, and the like: all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike. nay, number (itself) in armies, importeth not much, where the people is of weak courage: for (as virgil saith) it never troubles a wolf how many the sheep be. the army of the persians in the plains of arbela was such a vast sea of people, as it did somewhat astonish the commanders in alexander's army; who came to him therefore, and wished him to set upon them by night; but he answered, he would not pilfer the victory.
坚城、武库、名马、战车、巨象、大炮等等不过是披着狮子皮的绵羊，除非人民底体质和精神是坚强好战的。不特如此，若是民无勇气，则兵士数目之多是无关紧要的，委吉尔所谓“一只狼从不介意有多少只羊”者即指此也。在阿比拉（arbela）平原中的波斯军有如一片人海，竟使亚历山大军中的将领不免惊惶；因此他们来到亚历山大面前，并建议在夜间进攻；但是他说：“我不愿偷取胜利”。

and the defeat was easy. when tigranes the armenian, being encamped upon a hill, with four hundred thousand men, discovered the army of the romans being not above fourteen thousand marching towards him, he made himself merry with it, and said; yonder men are too many for an ambassage and too few for a fight. but before the sun set, he found them enough to give him the chase, with infinite slaughter. many are the examples, of the great odds between number and courage: so that a man may truly make a judgement, that the principal point of greatness in any state is to have a race of military men. neither is money the sinews of war (as it is trivially said), where the sinews of men's arms, in base and effeminate people, are failing. for solon said well to croesus (when in ostentation he showed him his gold), sir, if any other come that hath better iron than you he will be master of all this gold. therefore let any prince or state think soberly of his forces, except his militia of natives be of good and valiant soldiers.
结果是容容易易地打败了敌人。阿米尼亚王蒂格拉奈斯率四十万大军驻于一座山头，当他看见那不过一万四千的罗马军向他进攻的时候，他就说笑话道：“那些人若是使节则太多，若为战斗而来则太少了”。但是，那天底太阳落之前，他已经发现这些人很够追逐他并大戮他底军队了。关于数目不敌勇气的例子是很多的：因此我们不妨断言，任何国家若要伟大，其主要之点，就在要有一个善战的民族。“金钱是战争底筋肉”，这是句平常的老套，然而是人民卑污淫靡，其两臂底筋肉无力，则金钱也不能算是战争底筋肉了。因为索伦对克瑞萨斯（当克瑞萨斯为了炫示他底富有起见把他底藏金给索伦看的时候）所说的话是说得很好的。“陛下，若是另一人前来，他底胜于陛下底铁，那末他就要变成这些金子底主人了”。所以任何君王或国家，除非自己底国民组成的军队是优良骁勇的话，最好不要对自己底力量估价过高。

and let princes, on the other side, that have subjects of martial disposition, know their own strength; unless they be otherwise wanting unto themselves. as for mercenary forces (which is the help in this case), all examples show; that, whatsoever estate or prince doth rest upon them, he may spread his feathers for a time but he will mew them soon after.
在另一方面，那些有强悍好战的臣民的君王则应当知道自己力量——除非这些臣民在别的方面是有缺陷的。至于用金钱募集的客军（那就是自己底臣民不可靠的时候的助力），所有的先例都证明任何倚仗客军的政府或君主虽然可以得意一时，如鸟之张翼，然而不久将不免于铩羽也。
the blessing of judah and issachar will never meet; that the same people or nation, should be both the lion's whelp and the ass between burthens: neither will it be, that a people over-laid with taxes should ever become valiant, and martial. it is true, that taxes levied by consent of the estate, do abate men's courage less; as it hath been seen notably, in the excises of the low countries; and in some degree, in the subsidies of england. for you must note, that we speak now of the heart, and not of the purse. so that, although the same tribute and tax laid by
consent, or by imposing, be all one to the purse, yet it works diversely upon the courage. so that you may conclude; that no people over-charged with tribute is fit for empire.let states that aim at greatness, take heed how their nobility and gentlemen do multiply too fast. for that maketh the common subject grow to be a peasant, and base swain, driven out of heart, and in effect but the gentleman's labourer.
犹大和以萨迦底命运是永不会相合的，同一个民族或国家不会既是幼狮而又是负重的驴子一样；再者，一个困于租税的民族而要变为武勇好战，这也是不可能的。经国民同意而征收的租税比仅由掌权者片面征收的租税，减人勇气较少；荷兰底国税就是一个很明显的例子；在某种程度上，英国底特税也可算是一个例子。读者必须注意我们现在所论的是心胆的问题而不是钱包的问题。一样的赋税，不论是经国民同意与否，对于钱包的作用是同一的，但是对于人民底勇气，其作用可就不同了。因此你可以断定，凡是困于租税的人民是不适于建立帝国的。凡是志欲强大的国家应当小心，不可使国内的贵族和绅士阶级繁殖过速。因为这种情形将使平民变为农奴村夫，使他们意志沮丧，实际上成为上流阶级底奴仆而已。

even as you may see in coppice woods; if you leave your staddles too thick, you shall never have clean underwood, but shrubs and bushes. so in countries, if the gentlemen be too many, the commons will be base; and you will bring it to that, that not the hundred poll will be fit for an helmet: especially as to the infantry, which is the nerve of an army: and so there will be
great population, and little strength. this, which i speak of, hath been nowhere better seen, then by comparing of england and france; whereof england, though far less in territory and population, hath been (nevertheless) an overmatch; in regard, the middle people of england make good soldiers, which the peasants of france do not and herein, the device of king henry the seventh, (whereof i have spoken largely in the history of his life) was profound, and admirable; in making farms, and houses of husbandry, of a standard; that is, maintained with such a proportion of land unto mem, as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty, and no servile condition; and to keep the plough in the hands of the owners, and not mere hirelings.
这就好象你在丛林中可以见到的情形一样；假如你把小树留得过密，那末你就永不会有清清楚楚的丛林，而只能有矮树野薮。类此，在国家之内，如果上流阶级人数过多，则平民必降为卑下，其结果将至于一百个头颅没有一个配戴盔的；尤其对于那为军队之神经系统的步兵为然；如此的国家将有很大的人口而很小的力量了。我所谈的这一点，若要找个例子来证明它，那末最好是把英国和法国比较一下：两国之中，虽然英国在疆土和人口方面都不及法国，然而和法国敌对起来，却居然不止是个敌手；这就因为英国底一般民众能成为优良的兵士，而法国底乡农则不能也。在这一点上英王亨利第七底法度（关于这个法度曾在拙著《亨利第七本纪》中详言之）真是用意深远，值得钦佩的。他把田庄农舍都规划齐一了。所谓规划齐一者，就是依他底规定，凡是田庄农舍必须要受一定限度的田地底维持，这限度就在要使那田庄农舍里的人能以生活裕如不至沦入贱役；他这种制度又使耕田的人就是田底主人而非仅仅是雇佣之徒。

and thus indeed, you shall attain to virgil's character, which he gives to ancient italy: terra potens arrnis atque ubere glebae. neither is that state (which for anything i know, is almost peculiar to england and hardly to be found anywhere else, except it be perhaps in poland) to be passed over; i mean die state of free servants and attendants upon noblemen and gentlemen; which are no ways inferior unto the yeomanry for arms.
这样就可以达到委吉尔所形容的古意大利底性质了：一个兵强土肥因而伟大的国家。还有一种情形（这种情形据我所知几乎是英国特有的，除了或者在波兰以外，别处恐怕是遇不到的）也是不可忽略的：就是服侍贵族和绅士的都是自由人；而这些人在武事上毫不劣于中产的平民。
and therefore, out of all question, the splendour, and magnificence, and great retinues, and hospitality of noblemen and gentlemen received into custom, doth much conduce unto martial greatness. whereas, contrariwise, the close and reserved living of noblemen and gentlemen causeth a penury of military forces.
因此，贵族和上流人士底生活中那种种的荣华豪气，宾客之盛，礼仪之隆，一旦成为风习之后，的确都是很能引人到武功底伟大上去的。反之，贵族与上流人士底生活若是吝啬隐秘，则将使国内底武力大为削弱。

by all means, it is to be procured, that the trunk of nebuchadnezzar's tree of monarchy be great enough to bear the branches, and the boughs; that is, that the natural subjects of the crown or state bear a sufficient proportion to the stronger subjects that they govern. therefore all states, that are liberal of naturalisation towards strangers, are fit for empire. for to think that an handful of people can, with the greatest courage and policy in the world, embrace too large extent of dominion, it may hold for a time, but it will fail suddenly. the spartans were a nice people, in point of naturalisation; whereby, while they kept their compass, they stood firm; but when they did spread, and their boughs were becoming too great for their stem, they became a windfall upon the sudden. never any state was, in this point, so open to receive strangers into their body, as were the romans.
无论用何种方法，务须使尼布甲尼撒梦中所见的王国底躯干强大到能够支持枝叶的程度；这句话底意思就是，皇帝或政府底本族臣民同他们统属治理的异族人民比起来，其多寡须有正当的比例。因此，所有那些使异族人容易入籍归化的国家都是适于成为帝国的。若以为小小的民族，因其智勇绝伦，竟足以征服并保有过大的国度，这种事短时间是可能的，但是这样的国度不久将会突然灭亡的。斯巴达人对于入籍一事过于严密；因此，当他们守着自己底小小的国境的时候，他们底地位是很巩固的；但是到了他们底国境扩张，枝叶变得为躯干所不能支持的时候，他们就突然覆亡，如风吹果落一样。在入籍的这一点上，从来没有一国如罗马之易于容纳异族者。

therefore it sorted with them accordingly; for they grew to the greatest monarchy. their manner was, to grant naturalisation (which they called ins civitatis), and to grant it in the highest degree; that is, not only ins conmercci, ius connubii, ius heredhatis; but also, ius suffragii, and ius honorum. and this, not to singular persons alone, but likewise to whole families; yea to cities, and sometimes to nations. add to this, their custom of plantation of colonies; whereby the roman plant was removed into the soil of other nations. and putting both constitutions together, you will say, that it was not the roman that spread upon the world; but it was the world that spread upon the romans: and that was the sure way of greatness. i have marvelled sometimes at spain, how they clasp and contain so large dominions, with so few natural spaniards: but sure, the whole compass of spain is a very great body of a tree; far above rome and sparta at the first and besides, though they have not had that usage, to naturalise liberally; yet they have that, which is next to it; that is, to employ almost indifferently all nations in their militia of ordinary soldiers: yea, and sometimes in their highest commands. nay, it seemeth at this instant, they are sensible of this want of natives; as by the pragmatical sanction, now published, appeareth.
因此罗马人底结局也因之而很好；因为他们成了世界上最伟大的帝国。罗马人底办法是不仅把国籍权（他们叫做市民权）给予愿入籍的人而且是把这种权益极为充分地给予他：这就是说，他们不但把交易权，婚娶权和承继权给予愿入籍的人而且还把选举权和任官权给予这种人。并且这种的授权其受者不限于个人，一个家族也可以受这些权利；不但如此，一城的人，有时一国的人也可如此得享罗马公民底权利。此外再加上罗马人移民殖民底习惯，由于种习惯罗马这个植物就由本土而移植到异乡底土壤中了。把这两种制度加在一起，你尽可以说并不是罗马人发展到全世界去，而全世界发展到罗马来了；而这种情形确是大国之道。我曾对西班牙感觉惊异，就是道地的西班牙人如此之少，而何以他们能够占据并统辖这么大的属地呢？但是西班牙本国底疆土的确是一棵大树，较之罗马和斯巴达初起的时候，优胜得多了。并且，虽然他们没有容易准人入籍的惯例，可是他们有仅次于这个惯例的办法；就是，在他们底普通兵士组成的军队中所用的人是差不多毫无本国人与异族底分别的；不但如此，有时在他们底最高将领中也有异族人。又，就西王腓力普所颁的特诏看来，他们现在对于本国人口不足的这种情形似乎是很感觉到的。

it is certain, that sedentary and within-door arts, and delicate manufactures (that require rather the finger than the arm) have, in their nature, a contrariety to a military disposition. and generally, all warlike people are a little idle; and love danger better then travail: neither must they be too much broken of it, if they shall be preserved in vigour. 坐着作的，户内的技艺，以及精密的制造（需用手指之巧而不需用臂力之强者）在本性中就与好战的心理不合，这是无疑的。一般言之，所有好战的民族都有点游荡，爱危险甚于爱劳作。如果我们要他们仍旧保持那种武勇的精神，那我们就不可过于禁制或改移他们底好尚。
therefore, it was great advantage, in the ancient states of sparta, athens, rome and others, that they had the use of slaves which commonly did rid those manufactures.
因此，古代的斯巴达、雅典、罗马，以及其他的国家都蓄养奴隶，让他们担任那些劳作，这是他们那些国家底一个大便宜。

but that is abolished, in greatest part, by the christian law. that which cometh nearest to it, is to leave those arts chiefly to strangers (which for that purpose are the more easily to be received), and to contain the principal bulk of the vulgar natives, within those three kinds; tillers of the ground; free servants; and handy-craftsmen of strong and manly arts, as smiths, masons, carpenters, etc.; not reckoning professed soldiers.
但是蓄奴之制已由基督教底教律而大部废除了。最和蓄奴制相近的办法就是把那些技艺大部留给异族人去做（异族人为了这个原故也易在所在国里容身）而把本国人中一般民众底大多数限于三种工作或职业——耕者，自由的仆役；从事强力健壮的工作的工匠，如铁匠、泥匠、木匠等等：正式的军人还不算在内
but above all, for empire and greatness, it importeth most; that a nation do profess arms, as their principal honour, study, and occupation. for the things, which we formerly have spoken of, are but habitations towards arms: and what is habilitation without intention and act? romulus, after his death (as they report, or feign) sent a present to the romans; that, above all, they should intend arms; and then, they should prove the greatest empire of the world. the fabric of the state of sparta was wholly (though not wisely) framed, and composed, to that scope and end. the persians and macedonians had it for a flash. the gauls, germans, goths, saxons, normans and others, had it for a time. the turks have it, at this day, though in great declination.
但是，最要者，若欲国家强大，威权伸张，则一国之人务须把军事认为举国唯一的荣誉、学问和职业。因为我以上所说的那些事不过是军事底准备而已；但是若没有目的和行动，则准备又有何用？罗缪剌斯死后（这是人家传说或寓言的）给罗马人送来了一个忠告，教他们最要留心武事；若果他们这样做，他们将成为世界上最大的帝国。斯巴达底国家结构是全然（虽然不甚巧妙地）以武事为目的准则而建造组织成的。波斯人与马其顿人在很短的一瞬间有过这样举国皆兵的情形。高尔人、日耳曼人、戈斯人、萨克逊人、诺曼人和其他的民族在某一时代都有过这样的情形。土耳其人在如今还是这样的情形，虽然已经大为衰颓了。

of christian europe, they that have it, are, in effect, only the spaniards. but it is so plain, that every man profiteth in that he most intendeth, that it needeth not to be stood upon. it is enough to point at it; that no nation, which doth not directly profess arms, may look to have greatness fall into their mouths. and, on the other side, it is a most certain oracle of time; that those states, that continue long in that profession (as the romans and turks principally have done) do wonders. and those that have professed arms but for an age, have notwithstanding commonly attained that greatness in that age, which maintained them long after, when their profession and exercise of arms hath grown to decay.
在欧洲的基督教国中，有这种情形的国家实际只有西班牙一国。但是无论何人，其所最得力者就是平日所最致力者，这个道理太明显了，不必多说，我们只有略加指点就行了：就是，不干脆尚武的国家是不必希望会突然变为强大的。在相反的一方面，那些长期尚武的国家（如罗马人和土耳其人之所为）将成大业立奇功，这是历史底最可靠的教训。那些仅仅在某一时期曾经尚武的国家却也曾多半变为强大，而这种强大的情形，是到了后来他们对武事的崇尚与运用已经衰颓的时候，仍然为他们底支持物的。

incident to this point is; for a state, to have those laws or customs, which may reach forth unto them just occasions (as may be pretended) of war. for there is that justice imprinted in the nature of men, that they enter not upon wars (whereof so many calamities do ensue) but upon some, at the least specious, grounds and quarrels.
同这一点相连的还有一点，就是，一个国家顶好有一些法律或风俗，这种法律和风俗要使他们有作战的正当理由（或至少有所借口）才好。因为人性之中自有一种天赋的公道，除非有一点争战底根据或理由（至少是勉强可以算做理由的话头），他们是不肯加入那凶险甚多的战事的。
the turk hath at hand, for cause of war, the propagation of his law or sect; a quarrel that he may always command. the romans, though they esteemed the extending the limits of their empire to be great honour to their generals, when it was done, yet they never rested upon that alone, to begin a war. first therefore, let nations, that pretend to greatness, have this; that they be sensible of wrongs, either upon borderers, merchants, or politic ministers; and mat they sit not too long upon a provocation.
土耳其的君主为了作战，常以传播他底宗教为理由：这是一种很方便的，随时可以利用的理由。罗马人虽然在开疆拓土底事业已经成功之后，把这种事认为是统兵将帅底大荣耀，然而他们从未把开拓疆土一事认为起衅底好理由。因此，凡是志在强大的国家，第一应当有这点性质，就是，对于别国底侮辱伤害，要敏感，无论这种侮辱伤害是加于边邻，或施于本国底商人或使节的；并且对别人底撩拨，不可纵容过久。

secondly, let them be pressed and ready to give aids and succours, to their confederates: as it ever was with the roman: in so much, as if the confederate had leagues defensive with divers other states, and upon invasion offered, did implore their aids severally, yet the romans would ever be the foremost, and leave it to none other to have the honour. as for the wars which were anciently made on the behalf of a kind of party, or tacit conformity of estate, i do not see how they may be well justified: as when the romans made a war for the liberty of greece: or when the lacedaemonians and athenians made wars, to set up or pull down democracies, and oligarchies: or when wars were made by foreigners, under the pretence of justice, or protection, to deliver the subjects of others from tyranny, and oppression; and the like. let it suffice, that no estate expect to be great that is not awake, upon any just occasion of arming.
第二，他们应当常常准备着对他们底与国或同盟加以援助，如罗马人从来之所为一样；罗马人底办法是这样的，假令有一国与罗马之外的许多国家也曾缔结盟约互为保障，到了有敌国来犯的时候，并曾向这各国分头乞援，罗马人总是首先赴援，不让别的任何国家有这种荣誉。至于古人为了拥护一党一派或实质相同的政体而起的战争，我不懂那是有什么正当理由的：例如罗马人为了希腊底自由而战，斯巴达人和雅典人为了建立或倾覆民主政治和寡头政治而战，又如某一国底人，假借公道或人道底名义，来解除他一国中的专制与压迫，诸如此类者皆是也。总之，凡是不准备有了正当理由就立即动兵的国家，不必希冀强大也。

no body can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body, nor politic: and certainly, to a kingdom or estate, a just and honourable war is the true exercise. a civil war, indeed, is like the heat of a fever, but a foreign war is like the heat of exercise, and serveth to keep the body in health: for in a slothful peace, both courages will effeminate, and manners corrupt but howsoever it be for happiness, without all question, for greatness it maketh to be still, for the most part, in arms: and the strength of a veteran army (though it be a chargeable business), always on foot, is that, which commonly giveth the law, or at least the reputation amongst all neighbour states; as may well be seen in spain; which hath had, in one part or other, a veteran army, almost continually, now by the space of six-score years.
不论是个人底身体或国家底团体，如不运动则其体不强：而对于一个王国或共和国，一个有理由有光荣的战争乃是一种真实的运动，这是无疑的。内战真有如患病发热；但是对外作战则有如运动发热，是可以保持身体健康的；因为在一种偷惰的和平中，民气将变为柔靡而民德将变为腐败也。但是，不管为了幸福是怎么样，为了国家底强大起见，国民大部分常常从事武备是很有利的；一个常在行动中的，久经战阵的军队底力量（虽然这种力量是代价很高的），正即是使我在所有的邻国中能有发号施令之权（或者至少能有这种名誉）的工具也；西班牙就是一个很明显的例子，西班牙在欧洲各处差不多长期驻有精兵，已经约有120年之久了。

to be master of the sea is an abridgement of a monarchy. cicero writing to atticus, of pompey his preparation against caesar, saith; consilium pompeii plane themistocum est; putat enim, qui mari potitur, eum rerum potiri. and, without doubt, pompey had tired out caesar, if upon vain confidence, he had not left that way. we see the great effects of battles by sea. the battle of actium decided the empire of the world. the battle of lepanto arrested the greatness of the turks.
一个国家若能成为海上底主人就等于已成了一个帝国。西塞罗致书阿蒂苦斯论庞拜对恺撒的军事准备时说道：“庞拜所遵循的是一种真正的塞密斯陶立克斯式的策略：他以为那掌握海权的人，就是掌握一切的人”。无疑地，如果庞拜不因一时自大轻敌而舍舟从陆，他一定会使恺撒疲于奔命的。海战底重大影响是我们看得见的。埃克兴之战决定了罗马帝国之谁属。勒盘陶之战制止了土耳其人底强横。

there be many examples, where sea-fights have been final to the war; but this is, when princes or states have set up their rest upon the battles. but thus much is certain; that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much, and as little of the war, as he will. whereas those that be strongest by land, are many times nevertheless in great straits. surely, at this day, with us of europe, the vantage of strength at sea (which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of great britain) is great: both because, most of the kingdoms of europe are not merely inland, but girt with the sea, most part of their compass; and because, the wealth of both indies seems in great part but an accessory to the command of the seas.
海战为全部战争之最后决战者其例甚多。这种情形固然是君主或国家们把一切都凭海战来决定底结果，然而这点是确定的，就是握有海上霸权的一方是很自由的，在战争上它是可多可少，一随己意的。在相反的一方面，那些陆军最强的国家却往往感受极大的困难。无疑地，在今日，我们欧洲的诸国中，海上的势力（这种势力是大不列颠底主要的天赋优点之一）是一种很大的长处；一则因为欧洲底各国，大多数不是纯粹内陆的，而是国境底大部分临着海的；再则因为东西印度底财富底大部分似乎是唯有握着海上底霸权的人才能得着的。

the wars of latter ages seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory and honour, which reflected upon men, from the wars in ancient time. there be now, for martial encouragement, some degrees and orders of chivalry; which nevertheless, are conferred promiscuously upon soldiers and no soldiers; and some remembrance perhaps upon the scutcheon; and some hospitals for maimed soldiers; and such like things. but in ancient times; the trophies erected upon the place of the victory; the funeral laudatives and monuments for those that died in the wars; the crowns and garlands personal; the style of emperor, which the great kings of the world after borrowed; the triumphs of the generals upon their return; the great donatives and largesses upon the disbanding of the armies; were things able to inflame all men's courage. but above all, that of the triumph, amongst the romans, was not pageants or gaudery, but one of the wisest and noblest institutions that ever was.
与古代底战争所给予人的光辉荣耀相形之下，近代底战争简直是在黑暗中打的。为鼓励士气起见，现在也有些爵位勋章等等，然而这些东西是杂乱地颁发，无分军人或非军人的；此外也许还有些楯上的铭语，伤兵病院，诸如此类的东西。但是在古时，那在战胜地点树立的纪念品，追悼的颂辞，以及纪念阵亡将士的碑坊，奖给个人的花冠，大元帅底名义，（就是后来的各国君主所借用的），凯旋将帅底胜利游行；兵队复员时的重大犒赏；这都是能引起人人底勇气的事物。但是，最重要者，莫过于罗马人底凯旋式，这种凯旋式并不仅是仪式或夸耀，而是一种极其聪明伟大的制度。

for it contained three things; honour to the general; riches to the treasury out of the spoils; and donatives to the army. but that honour, perhaps, were not fit for monarchies; except it be in the person of the monarch himself, or his sons; as it came to pass, in the times of the roman emperors, who did appropriate the actual triumphs to themselves, and their sons, for such wars as they did achieve in person: and left only, for wars achieved by subjects, some triumphal garments, and ensigns, to the general.
因为它里面包含三样事情；在将帅方面是尊荣；在国库方面是由战利品而增进了财富；在军队方面是赏赐。不过那种尊荣也许是不适于君主国的；除非把它归之于君主本人或他底子嗣们，如后来的罗马皇帝们之所为一样，他们把自己或子嗣曾经亲自参加的战役底凯旋式由自己或子嗣包办了，而在臣子得来的胜仗中，则仅对统兵将帅予以庆功的衣服和勋章。

to conclude; no man can, by care taking (as the scripture saith) add a cubit to his stature, in this little model of man's body: but in the great frame of kingdoms, and commonwealths, it is in the power of princes, or estates, to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms. for by introducing such ordinances, constitutions, and customs, as we have now touched, they may sow greatness to their posterity, and succession. but these things are commonly not observed, but left to take their chance.
总之；如《圣书》所说，谁也不能因为用了心思的原故而对这个小结构——人体——加高一寸；但是在大结构如王国或共和国中，则为君主者或执政者可以使他们底国家增强滋大的；因为如果他们肯把我们上面论及的法令，宪章，习俗试行国内，则他们是可以给后世或继位者种下强大之因的。然而这些事普通多不受人注意，一任其自己随时运而晦明焉。

培根散文随笔集中英对照，通过阅读文学名著学语言，是掌握英语的绝佳方法。既可接触原汁原味的英语，又能享受文学之美，一举两得，何乐不为？
29 of the true greatness of kingdoms & estates 论邦国底真正伟大之处
雅典人塞密斯陶克立斯在某次宴会上有人想请他弹琵琶。他说他不会弄琴可是会把一个小城弄成一座大邦。这句话因为过于归功自己，所以是骄傲不逊；但是如果一般地用在别人身上，则可算是很庄肃贤明的评论。这句话（再用譬喻底说法引申一下）就可以把从事国政者之中两种不同的才能表现出来。因为，如果把议事和执政的各官真正地观察一下，其中也许可以发见（虽然这是很稀有的）几个能使小国变为大邦，而不能弄琴的人；同时，在另一方面，却可以发现许多巧于弄琴可是不但不能使小国变为大邦，而且是有相反的天才的人，他们是能把一个伟大而兴盛的国家带到衰败凋零的地步的。并且，那些堕落的技巧智能，许多公卿大夫借之以邀宠于主上钓名于流俗者，确是除了“弄琴”之名，不值得更好的名称的：因为这些技巧智能不过是一时欢乐之资，在会者本人虽可借以炫耀，而于他们所事的国家之幸福与进步，则无所裨益也。

当然，也有些公卿大夫够得上一个“能”字的（即所谓“干才”）。他们能够调理国政，不使陷于危难和明显的困境，可是若要把国家在力量，财富，国运上都增强长大，则他们断断无此能力。现在我们不管做事的人怎么样，且一谈事务底本身；就是，国家底真正伟大之处以及达到这种情形的方法。这是一个值得雄王英主常常考虑的题目；为的是他们既可以不至于因为过于相信自己底力量而多事妄为，虚耗实力；又可以不至于因为过于卑视自己底力量而屈尊以从怯懦畏葸的计议也。

一个国家底疆土之大小是可以测量的；其财赋收入之多少是可以计算的。它底人口可由户口册卷而得见，城镇之多少及大小则可由图表而知之。然而在人事中没有比关于一国底力量的真正估计推断更为易于错误的。
基督把天国不譬做任何巨大的果核或种子而譬做一粒芥子；即是一种最小的种子，但是却有一种迅速发芽及长大底特性与精神。类此，有些国家底疆土很大，可是不能伸张国力或领袖他国；又有些国家幅员很小，有如一种躯干微小的植物，然而却能为强大的帝国之基础

坚城、武库、名马、战车、巨象、大炮等等不过是披着狮子皮的绵羊，除非人民底体质和精神是坚强好战的。不特如此，若是民无勇气，则兵士数目之多是无关紧要的，委吉尔所谓“一只狼从不介意有多少只羊”者即指此也。在阿比拉（arbela）平原中的波斯军有如一片人海，竟使亚历山大军中的将领不免惊惶；因此他们来到亚历山大面前，并建议在夜间进攻；但是他说：“我不愿偷取胜利”。

结果是容容易易地打败了敌人。阿米尼亚王蒂格拉奈斯率四十万大军驻于一座山头，当他看见那不过一万四千的罗马军向他进攻的时候，他就说笑话道：“那些人若是使节则太多，若为战斗而来则太少了”。但是，那天底太阳落之前，他已经发现这些人很够追逐他并大戮他底军队了。关于数目不敌勇气的例子是很多的：因此我们不妨断言，任何国家若要伟大，其主要之点，就在要有一个善战的民族。“金钱是战争底筋肉”，这是句平常的老套，然而是人民卑污淫靡，其两臂底筋肉无力，则金钱也不能算是战争底筋肉了。因为索伦对克瑞萨斯（当克瑞萨斯为了炫示他底富有起见把他底藏金给索伦看的时候）所说的话是说得很好的。“陛下，若是另一人前来，他底胜于陛下底铁，那末他就要变成这些金子底主人了”。所以任何君王或国家，除非自己底国民组成的军队是优良骁勇的话，最好不要对自己底力量估价过高。

在另一方面，那些有强悍好战的臣民的君王则应当知道自己力量——除非这些臣民在别的方面是有缺陷的。至于用金钱募集的客军（那就是自己底臣民不可靠的时候的助力），所有的先例都证明任何倚仗客军的政府或君主虽然可以得意一时，如鸟之张翼，然而不久将不免于铩羽也。
犹大和以萨迦底命运是永不会相合的，同一个民族或国家不会既是幼狮而又是负重的驴子一样；再者，一个困于租税的民族而要变为武勇好战，这也是不可能的。经国民同意而征收的租税比仅由掌权者片面征收的租税，减人勇气较少；荷兰底国税就是一个很明显的例子；在某种程度上，英国底特税也可算是一个例子。读者必须注意我们现在所论的是心胆的问题而不是钱包的问题。一样的赋税，不论是经国民同意与否，对于钱包的作用是同一的，但是对于人民底勇气，其作用可就不同了。因此你可以断定，凡是困于租税的人民是不适于建立帝国的。凡是志欲强大的国家应当小心，不可使国内的贵族和绅士阶级繁殖过速。因为这种情形将使平民变为农奴村夫，使他们意志沮丧，实际上成为上流阶级底奴仆而已。

这就好象你在丛林中可以见到的情形一样；假如你把小树留得过密，那末你就永不会有清清楚楚的丛林，而只能有矮树野薮。类此，在国家之内，如果上流阶级人数过多，则平民必降为卑下，其结果将至于一百个头颅没有一个配戴盔的；尤其对于那为军队之神经系统的步兵为然；如此的国家将有很大的人口而很小的力量了。我所谈的这一点，若要找个例子来证明它，那末最好是把英国和法国比较一下：两国之中，虽然英国在疆土和人口方面都不及法国，然而和法国敌对起来，却居然不止是个敌手；这就因为英国底一般民众能成为优良的兵士，而法国底乡农则不能也。在这一点上英王亨利第七底法度（关于这个法度曾在拙著《亨利第七本纪》中详言之）真是用意深远，值得钦佩的。他把田庄农舍都规划齐一了。所谓规划齐一者，就是依他底规定，凡是田庄农舍必须要受一定限度的田地底维持，这限度就在要使那田庄农舍里的人能以生活裕如不至沦入贱役；他这种制度又使耕田的人就是田底主人而非仅仅是雇佣之徒。

这样就可以达到委吉尔所形容的古意大利底性质了：一个兵强土肥因而伟大的国家。还有一种情形（这种情形据我所知几乎是英国特有的，除了或者在波兰以外，别处恐怕是遇不到的）也是不可忽略的：就是服侍贵族和绅士的都是自由人；而这些人在武事上毫不劣于中产的平民。
因此，贵族和上流人士底生活中那种种的荣华豪气，宾客之盛，礼仪之隆，一旦成为风习之后，的确都是很能引人到武功底伟大上去的。反之，贵族与上流人士底生活若是吝啬隐秘，则将使国内底武力大为削弱。

无论用何种方法，务须使尼布甲尼撒梦中所见的王国底躯干强大到能够支持枝叶的程度；这句话底意思就是，皇帝或政府底本族臣民同他们统属治理的异族人民比起来，其多寡须有正当的比例。因此，所有那些使异族人容易入籍归化的国家都是适于成为帝国的。若以为小小的民族，因其智勇绝伦，竟足以征服并保有过大的国度，这种事短时间是可能的，但是这样的国度不久将会突然灭亡的。斯巴达人对于入籍一事过于严密；因此，当他们守着自己底小小的国境的时候，他们底地位是很巩固的；但是到了他们底国境扩张，枝叶变得为躯干所不能支持的时候，他们就突然覆亡，如风吹果落一样。在入籍的这一点上，从来没有一国如罗马之易于容纳异族者。

因此罗马人底结局也因之而很好；因为他们成了世界上最伟大的帝国。罗马人底办法是不仅把国籍权（他们叫做市民权）给予愿入籍的人而且是把这种权益极为充分地给予他：这就是说，他们不但把交易权，婚娶权和承继权给予愿入籍的人而且还把选举权和任官权给予这种人。并且这种的授权其受者不限于个人，一个家族也可以受这些权利；不但如此，一城的人，有时一国的人也可如此得享罗马公民底权利。此外再加上罗马人移民殖民底习惯，由于种习惯罗马这个植物就由本土而移植到异乡底土壤中了。把这两种制度加在一起，你尽可以说并不是罗马人发展到全世界去，而全世界发展到罗马来了；而这种情形确是大国之道。我曾对西班牙感觉惊异，就是道地的西班牙人如此之少，而何以他们能够占据并统辖这么大的属地呢？但是西班牙本国底疆土的确是一棵大树，较之罗马和斯巴达初起的时候，优胜得多了。并且，虽然他们没有容易准人入籍的惯例，可是他们有仅次于这个惯例的办法；就是，在他们底普通兵士组成的军队中所用的人是差不多毫无本国人与异族底分别的；不但如此，有时在他们底最高将领中也有异族人。又，就西王腓力普所颁的特诏看来，他们现在对于本国人口不足的这种情形似乎是很感觉到的。

it is certain, that sedentary and within-door arts, and delicate manufactures (that require rather the finger than the arm) have, in their nature, a contrariety to a military disposition. and generally, all warlike people are a little idle; and love danger better then travail: neither must they be too much broken of it, if they shall be preserved in vigour. 坐着作的，户内的技艺，以及精密的制造（需用手指之巧而不需用臂力之强者）在本性中就与好战的心理不合，这是无疑的。一般言之，所有好战的民族都有点游荡，爱危险甚于爱劳作。如果我们要他们仍旧保持那种武勇的精神，那我们就不可过于禁制或改移他们底好尚。
因此，古代的斯巴达、雅典、罗马，以及其他的国家都蓄养奴隶，让他们担任那些劳作，这是他们那些国家底一个大便宜。

但是蓄奴之制已由基督教底教律而大部废除了。最和蓄奴制相近的办法就是把那些技艺大部留给异族人去做（异族人为了这个原故也易在所在国里容身）而把本国人中一般民众底大多数限于三种工作或职业——耕者，自由的仆役；从事强力健壮的工作的工匠，如铁匠、泥匠、木匠等等：正式的军人还不算在内
但是，最要者，若欲国家强大，威权伸张，则一国之人务须把军事认为举国唯一的荣誉、学问和职业。因为我以上所说的那些事不过是军事底准备而已；但是若没有目的和行动，则准备又有何用？罗缪剌斯死后（这是人家传说或寓言的）给罗马人送来了一个忠告，教他们最要留心武事；若果他们这样做，他们将成为世界上最大的帝国。斯巴达底国家结构是全然（虽然不甚巧妙地）以武事为目的准则而建造组织成的。波斯人与马其顿人在很短的一瞬间有过这样举国皆兵的情形。高尔人、日耳曼人、戈斯人、萨克逊人、诺曼人和其他的民族在某一时代都有过这样的情形。土耳其人在如今还是这样的情形，虽然已经大为衰颓了。

在欧洲的基督教国中，有这种情形的国家实际只有西班牙一国。但是无论何人，其所最得力者就是平日所最致力者，这个道理太明显了，不必多说，我们只有略加指点就行了：就是，不干脆尚武的国家是不必希望会突然变为强大的。在相反的一方面，那些长期尚武的国家（如罗马人和土耳其人之所为）将成大业立奇功，这是历史底最可靠的教训。那些仅仅在某一时期曾经尚武的国家却也曾多半变为强大，而这种强大的情形，是到了后来他们对武事的崇尚与运用已经衰颓的时候，仍然为他们底支持物的。

同这一点相连的还有一点，就是，一个国家顶好有一些法律或风俗，这种法律和风俗要使他们有作战的正当理由（或至少有所借口）才好。因为人性之中自有一种天赋的公道，除非有一点争战底根据或理由（至少是勉强可以算做理由的话头），他们是不肯加入那凶险甚多的战事的。
土耳其的君主为了作战，常以传播他底宗教为理由：这是一种很方便的，随时可以利用的理由。罗马人虽然在开疆拓土底事业已经成功之后，把这种事认为是统兵将帅底大荣耀，然而他们从未把开拓疆土一事认为起衅底好理由。因此，凡是志在强大的国家，第一应当有这点性质，就是，对于别国底侮辱伤害，要敏感，无论这种侮辱伤害是加于边邻，或施于本国底商人或使节的；并且对别人底撩拨，不可纵容过久。

第二，他们应当常常准备着对他们底与国或同盟加以援助，如罗马人从来之所为一样；罗马人底办法是这样的，假令有一国与罗马之外的许多国家也曾缔结盟约互为保障，到了有敌国来犯的时候，并曾向这各国分头乞援，罗马人总是首先赴援，不让别的任何国家有这种荣誉。至于古人为了拥护一党一派或实质相同的政体而起的战争，我不懂那是有什么正当理由的：例如罗马人为了希腊底自由而战，斯巴达人和雅典人为了建立或倾覆民主政治和寡头政治而战，又如某一国底人，假借公道或人道底名义，来解除他一国中的专制与压迫，诸如此类者皆是也。总之，凡是不准备有了正当理由就立即动兵的国家，不必希冀强大也。

不论是个人底身体或国家底团体，如不运动则其体不强：而对于一个王国或共和国，一个有理由有光荣的战争乃是一种真实的运动，这是无疑的。内战真有如患病发热；但是对外作战则有如运动发热，是可以保持身体健康的；因为在一种偷惰的和平中，民气将变为柔靡而民德将变为腐败也。但是，不管为了幸福是怎么样，为了国家底强大起见，国民大部分常常从事武备是很有利的；一个常在行动中的，久经战阵的军队底力量（虽然这种力量是代价很高的），正即是使我在所有的邻国中能有发号施令之权（或者至少能有这种名誉）的工具也；西班牙就是一个很明显的例子，西班牙在欧洲各处差不多长期驻有精兵，已经约有120年之久了。

一个国家若能成为海上底主人就等于已成了一个帝国。西塞罗致书阿蒂苦斯论庞拜对恺撒的军事准备时说道：“庞拜所遵循的是一种真正的塞密斯陶立克斯式的策略：他以为那掌握海权的人，就是掌握一切的人”。无疑地，如果庞拜不因一时自大轻敌而舍舟从陆，他一定会使恺撒疲于奔命的。海战底重大影响是我们看得见的。埃克兴之战决定了罗马帝国之谁属。勒盘陶之战制止了土耳其人底强横。

海战为全部战争之最后决战者其例甚多。这种情形固然是君主或国家们把一切都凭海战来决定底结果，然而这点是确定的，就是握有海上霸权的一方是很自由的，在战争上它是可多可少，一随己意的。在相反的一方面，那些陆军最强的国家却往往感受极大的困难。无疑地，在今日，我们欧洲的诸国中，海上的势力（这种势力是大不列颠底主要的天赋优点之一）是一种很大的长处；一则因为欧洲底各国，大多数不是纯粹内陆的，而是国境底大部分临着海的；再则因为东西印度底财富底大部分似乎是唯有握着海上底霸权的人才能得着的。

与古代底战争所给予人的光辉荣耀相形之下，近代底战争简直是在黑暗中打的。为鼓励士气起见，现在也有些爵位勋章等等，然而这些东西是杂乱地颁发，无分军人或非军人的；此外也许还有些楯上的铭语，伤兵病院，诸如此类的东西。但是在古时，那在战胜地点树立的纪念品，追悼的颂辞，以及纪念阵亡将士的碑坊，奖给个人的花冠，大元帅底名义，（就是后来的各国君主所借用的），凯旋将帅底胜利游行；兵队复员时的重大犒赏；这都是能引起人人底勇气的事物。但是，最重要者，莫过于罗马人底凯旋式，这种凯旋式并不仅是仪式或夸耀，而是一种极其聪明伟大的制度。

因为它里面包含三样事情；在将帅方面是尊荣；在国库方面是由战利品而增进了财富；在军队方面是赏赐。不过那种尊荣也许是不适于君主国的；除非把它归之于君主本人或他底子嗣们，如后来的罗马皇帝们之所为一样，他们把自己或子嗣曾经亲自参加的战役底凯旋式由自己或子嗣包办了，而在臣子得来的胜仗中，则仅对统兵将帅予以庆功的衣服和勋章。

总之；如《圣书》所说，谁也不能因为用了心思的原故而对这个小结构——人体——加高一寸；但是在大结构如王国或共和国中，则为君主者或执政者可以使他们底国家增强滋大的；因为如果他们肯把我们上面论及的法令，宪章，习俗试行国内，则他们是可以给后世或继位者种下强大之因的。然而这些事普通多不受人注意，一任其自己随时运而晦明焉。

the speech of themistocles the athenian, which was haughty and arrogant, in taking so much to himself, had been a grave and wise observation and censure, applied at large to others. desired at a feast to touch a lute, he said; he could not fiddle, but yet he could make a small town, a great city. these words (holpen a little with a metaphor) may express two differing abilities, in those mat deal in business of estate. for if a true survey be taken, of counsellors and statesmen, there may be found (though rarely) those which can make a small state great and yet cannot fiddle: as on the other side, there will be found a great many, that can fiddle very cunningly, but yet are so far from being able to make a small state great as their gift lieth the other way; to bring a great and flourishing estate to ruin and decay. and certainly, those degenerate arts and shifts, whereby many counsellor and governors gain both favour with their masters, and estimation with the vulgar, deserve no better name then fiddling; being things rather pleasing for the time, and graceful to themselves only, than tending to the weal and advancement of the state which they serve.
there are also (no doubt) counsellor and governors, which may be held sufficient (negotus pares), able to manage affairs, and to keep them from precipices and manifest inconveniences; which nevertheless, are far from the ability to raise and amplify an estate, in power, means, and fortune. but be the workmen what they may be, let us speak of the work; that is, the true greatness of kingdoms and estates; and the means thereof. an argument, fit for great and mighty princes to have in their hand; to the end, that neither by over-measuring their forces, they lose themselves in vain enterprises; nor on the other side, by undervaluing them, they descend to fearful and pusillanimous counsels.
the greatness of an estate in bulk and territory doth fall under measure; and the greatness of finances and revenue doth fall under computation. the population may appear by musters: and the number and greatness of cities and towns, by cards and maps. but yet there is not anything amongst civil affairs more subject to error, than the right valuation, and true judgement,
concerning the power and forces of an estate.
the kingdom of heaven is compared, not to any great kernel or nut, but to a grain of mustard-seed; which is one of the least grains, but hath in it a property and spirit, hastily to get up and spread. so are there states, great in territory, and yet not apt to enlarge, or command; and some, that have but a small dimension of stem, and yet apt to be the foundations of great monarchies.
walled towns, stored arsenals and armouries, goodly races of horse, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery, and the like: all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike. nay, number (itself) in armies, importeth not much, where the people is of weak courage: for (as virgil saith) it never troubles a wolf how many the sheep be. the army of the persians in the plains of arbela was such a vast sea of people, as it did somewhat astonish the commanders in alexander's army; who came to him therefore, and wished him to set upon them by night; but he answered, he would not pilfer the victory.
and the defeat was easy. when tigranes the armenian, being encamped upon a hill, with four hundred thousand men, discovered the army of the romans being not above fourteen thousand marching towards him, he made himself merry with it, and said; yonder men are too many for an ambassage and too few for a fight. but before the sun set, he found them enough to give him the chase, with infinite slaughter. many are the examples, of the great odds between number and courage: so that a man may truly make a judgement, that the principal point of greatness in any state is to have a race of military men. neither is money the sinews of war (as it is trivially said), where the sinews of men's arms, in base and effeminate people, are failing. for solon said well to croesus (when in ostentation he showed him his gold), sir, if any other come that hath better iron than you he will be master of all this gold. therefore let any prince or state think soberly of his forces, except his militia of natives be of good and valiant soldiers.
and let princes, on the other side, that have subjects of martial disposition, know their own strength; unless they be otherwise wanting unto themselves. as for mercenary forces (which is the help in this case), all examples show; that, whatsoever estate or prince doth rest upon them, he may spread his feathers for a time but he will mew them soon after.
the blessing of judah and issachar will never meet; that the same people or nation, should be both the lion's whelp and the ass between burthens: neither will it be, that a people over-laid with taxes should ever become valiant, and martial. it is true, that taxes levied by consent of the estate, do abate men's courage less; as it hath been seen notably, in the excises of the low countries; and in some degree, in the subsidies of england. for you must note, that we speak now of the heart, and not of the purse. so that, although the same tribute and tax laid by
consent, or by imposing, be all one to the purse, yet it works diversely upon the courage. so that you may conclude; that no people over-charged with tribute is fit for empire.let states that aim at greatness, take heed how their nobility and gentlemen do multiply too fast. for that maketh the common subject grow to be a peasant, and base swain, driven out of heart, and in effect but the gentleman's labourer.
even as you may see in coppice woods; if you leave your staddles too thick, you shall never have clean underwood, but shrubs and bushes. so in countries, if the gentlemen be too many, the commons will be base; and you will bring it to that, that not the hundred poll will be fit for an helmet: especially as to the infantry, which is the nerve of an army: and so there will be
great population, and little strength. this, which i speak of, hath been nowhere better seen, then by comparing of england and france; whereof england, though far less in territory and population, hath been (nevertheless) an overmatch; in regard, the middle people of england make good soldiers, which the peasants of france do not and herein, the device of king henry the seventh, (whereof i have spoken largely in the history of his life) was profound, and admirable; in making farms, and houses of husbandry, of a standard; that is, maintained with such a proportion of land unto mem, as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty, and no servile condition; and to keep the plough in the hands of the owners, and not mere hirelings.
and thus indeed, you shall attain to virgil's character, which he gives to ancient italy: terra potens arrnis atque ubere glebae. neither is that state (which for anything i know, is almost peculiar to england and hardly to be found anywhere else, except it be perhaps in poland) to be passed over; i mean die state of free servants and attendants upon noblemen and gentlemen; which are no ways inferior unto the yeomanry for arms.
and therefore, out of all question, the splendour, and magnificence, and great retinues, and hospitality of noblemen and gentlemen received into custom, doth much conduce unto martial greatness. whereas, contrariwise, the close and reserved living of noblemen and gentlemen causeth a penury of military forces.
by all means, it is to be procured, that the trunk of nebuchadnezzar's tree of monarchy be great enough to bear the branches, and the boughs; that is, that the natural subjects of the crown or state bear a sufficient proportion to the stronger subjects that they govern. therefore all states, that are liberal of naturalisation towards strangers, are fit for empire. for to think that an handful of people can, with the greatest courage and policy in the world, embrace too large extent of dominion, it may hold for a time, but it will fail suddenly. the spartans were a nice people, in point of naturalisation; whereby, while they kept their compass, they stood firm; but when they did spread, and their boughs were becoming too great for their stem, they became a windfall upon the sudden. never any state was, in this point, so open to receive strangers into their body, as were the romans.
therefore it sorted with them accordingly; for they grew to the greatest monarchy. their manner was, to grant naturalisation (which they called ins civitatis), and to grant it in the highest degree; that is, not only ins conmercci, ius connubii, ius heredhatis; but also, ius suffragii, and ius honorum. and this, not to singular persons alone, but likewise to whole families; yea to cities, and sometimes to nations. add to this, their custom of plantation of colonies; whereby the roman plant was removed into the soil of other nations. and putting both constitutions together, you will say, that it was not the roman that spread upon the world; but it was the world that spread upon the romans: and that was the sure way of greatness. i have marvelled sometimes at spain, how they clasp and contain so large dominions, with so few natural spaniards: but sure, the whole compass of spain is a very great body of a tree; far above rome and sparta at the first and besides, though they have not had that usage, to naturalise liberally; yet they have that, which is next to it; that is, to employ almost indifferently all nations in their militia of ordinary soldiers: yea, and sometimes in their highest commands. nay, it seemeth at this instant, they are sensible of this want of natives; as by the pragmatical sanction, now published, appeareth.
therefore, it was great advantage, in the ancient states of sparta, athens, rome and others, that they had the use of slaves which commonly did rid those manufactures.
but that is abolished, in greatest part, by the christian law. that which cometh nearest to it, is to leave those arts chiefly to strangers (which for that purpose are the more easily to be received), and to contain the principal bulk of the vulgar natives, within those three kinds; tillers of the ground; free servants; and handy-craftsmen of strong and manly arts, as smiths, masons, carpenters, etc.; not reckoning professed soldiers.
but above all, for empire and greatness, it importeth most; that a nation do profess arms, as their principal honour, study, and occupation. for the things, which we formerly have spoken of, are but habitations towards arms: and what is habilitation without intention and act? romulus, after his death (as they report, or feign) sent a present to the romans; that, above all, they should intend arms; and then, they should prove the greatest empire of the world. the fabric of the state of sparta was wholly (though not wisely) framed, and composed, to that scope and end. the persians and macedonians had it for a flash. the gauls, germans, goths, saxons, normans and others, had it for a time. the turks have it, at this day, though in great declination.
of christian europe, they that have it, are, in effect, only the spaniards. but it is so plain, that every man profiteth in that he most intendeth, that it needeth not to be stood upon. it is enough to point at it; that no nation, which doth not directly profess arms, may look to have greatness fall into their mouths. and, on the other side, it is a most certain oracle of time; that those states, that continue long in that profession (as the romans and turks principally have done) do wonders. and those that have professed arms but for an age, have notwithstanding commonly attained that greatness in that age, which maintained them long after, when their profession and exercise of arms hath grown to decay.
incident to this point is; for a state, to have those laws or customs, which may reach forth unto them just occasions (as may be pretended) of war. for there is that justice imprinted in the nature of men, that they enter not upon wars (whereof so many calamities do ensue) but upon some, at the least specious, grounds and quarrels.
the turk hath at hand, for cause of war, the propagation of his law or sect; a quarrel that he may always command. the romans, though they esteemed the extending the limits of their empire to be great honour to their generals, when it was done, yet they never rested upon that alone, to begin a war. first therefore, let nations, that pretend to greatness, have this; that they be sensible of wrongs, either upon borderers, merchants, or politic ministers; and mat they sit not too long upon a provocation.
secondly, let them be pressed and ready to give aids and succours, to their confederates: as it ever was with the roman: in so much, as if the confederate had leagues defensive with divers other states, and upon invasion offered, did implore their aids severally, yet the romans would ever be the foremost, and leave it to none other to have the honour. as for the wars which were anciently made on the behalf of a kind of party, or tacit conformity of estate, i do not see how they may be well justified: as when the romans made a war for the liberty of greece: or when the lacedaemonians and athenians made wars, to set up or pull down democracies, and oligarchies: or when wars were made by foreigners, under the pretence of justice, or protection, to deliver the subjects of others from tyranny, and oppression; and the like. let it suffice, that no estate expect to be great that is not awake, upon any just occasion of arming.
no body can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body, nor politic: and certainly, to a kingdom or estate, a just and honourable war is the true exercise. a civil war, indeed, is like the heat of a fever, but a foreign war is like the heat of exercise, and serveth to keep the body in health: for in a slothful peace, both courages will effeminate, and manners corrupt but howsoever it be for happiness, without all question, for greatness it maketh to be still, for the most part, in arms: and the strength of a veteran army (though it be a chargeable business), always on foot, is that, which commonly giveth the law, or at least the reputation amongst all neighbour states; as may well be seen in spain; which hath had, in one part or other, a veteran army, almost continually, now by the space of six-score years.
to be master of the sea is an abridgement of a monarchy. cicero writing to atticus, of pompey his preparation against caesar, saith; consilium pompeii plane themistocum est; putat enim, qui mari potitur, eum rerum potiri. and, without doubt, pompey had tired out caesar, if upon vain confidence, he had not left that way. we see the great effects of battles by sea. the battle of actium decided the empire of the world. the battle of lepanto arrested the greatness of the turks.
there be many examples, where sea-fights have been final to the war; but this is, when princes or states have set up their rest upon the battles. but thus much is certain; that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much, and as little of the war, as he will. whereas those that be strongest by land, are many times nevertheless in great straits. surely, at this day, with us of europe, the vantage of strength at sea (which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of great britain) is great: both because, most of the kingdoms of europe are not merely inland, but girt with the sea, most part of their compass; and because, the wealth of both indies seems in great part but an accessory to the command of the seas.
the wars of latter ages seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory and honour, which reflected upon men, from the wars in ancient time. there be now, for martial encouragement, some degrees and orders of chivalry; which nevertheless, are conferred promiscuously upon soldiers and no soldiers; and some remembrance perhaps upon the scutcheon; and some hospitals for maimed soldiers; and such like things. but in ancient times; the trophies erected upon the place of the victory; the funeral laudatives and monuments for those that died in the wars; the crowns and garlands personal; the style of emperor, which the great kings of the world after borrowed; the triumphs of the generals upon their return; the great donatives and largesses upon the disbanding of the armies; were things able to inflame all men's courage. but above all, that of the triumph, amongst the romans, was not pageants or gaudery, but one of the wisest and noblest institutions that ever was.
for it contained three things; honour to the general; riches to the treasury out of the spoils; and donatives to the army. but that honour, perhaps, were not fit for monarchies; except it be in the person of the monarch himself, or his sons; as it came to pass, in the times of the roman emperors, who did appropriate the actual triumphs to themselves, and their sons, for such wars as they did achieve in person: and left only, for wars achieved by subjects, some triumphal garments, and ensigns, to the general.
to conclude; no man can, by care taking (as the scripture saith) add a cubit to his stature, in this little model of man's body: but in the great frame of kingdoms, and commonwealths, it is in the power of princes, or estates, to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms. for by introducing such ordinances, constitutions, and customs, as we have now touched, they may sow greatness to their posterity, and succession. but these things are commonly not observed, but left to take their chance.