第19章：Of Empire 论王权（中英对照）

培根散文随笔集中英对照，通过阅读文学名著学语言，是掌握英语的绝佳方法。既可接触原汁原味的英语，又能享受文学之美，一举两得，何乐不为？
19 of empire 论王权
it is a miserable state of mind, to have few things to desire, and many things to fear: and yet that commonly is the case of kings; who being at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes their minds more languishing; and have many representations of perils and shadows, which makes their minds the less clear.
所欲者甚少而所畏者甚多，这种心理是一种痛苦可怜的心理；然而为帝王者其情形多是如此。他们因为尊贵已极，所以没有什么可希冀的，这就使得他们底精神萎靡不振；同时他们又有许多关于危难暗祸的想象，这又使他们底心智不宁了

and this is one reason also of that effect, which the scripture speaketh of; that the king's heart is inscrutable. for multitude of jealousies, and lack of some predominant desire, that should marshal and put in order all the rest, maketh any man's heart hard to find, or sound. hence it comes likewise, that princes, many times, make themselves desires, and set their hearts upon toys: sometimes upon a building; sometimes upon erecting of an order, sometimes upon the advancing of a person; sometimes upon obtaining excellency in some art, or feat of the hand; as nero for playing on the harp, domitian for certainty of the hand with the arrow, commodus for playing at fence, caracalla for driving chariots, and the like. this seemeth incredible unto those that know not the principle; that the mind of man is more cheered, and refreshed, by profiting in small things, than by standing at a stay in great we see also that kings, that have been fortunate conquerors in their first years; it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely, but that they must have some check or arrest in their fortunes; turn in their latter years to be superstitious and melancholy: as did alexander the great;dioclesian; and in our memory, charles the fifth; and others: for he that is used go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favour, and is not the thing he was.
这也就是《圣经》中所谓“君心难测”的那种情形底原因之一。因为畏忌多端而没有一宗主要的欲望可以指挥并约束其余的欲望，这种心理会使得任何人底心都是难以测度也。因此有许多君王常为自己造欲望，并专心于细事；这些细事有时是一座建筑，有时是建立一个教宗，有时是擢升一人，有时是要专精一艺或一技，如尼罗之于琴，道密先之于射，可谟达斯之于剑，卡剌卡拉之于御，以及类此者皆是也。这对于那些不知道下列的原理的人好象是不可思议的，那原理就是人底心理乐于在小事上得益，而不乐于在大事上滞留。我们也常见那些在早年曾为幸运的胜利者的帝王，因为他们不能永远进取，而在幸运中不得不受限制的原故，在晚年变为迷信而且寡欢；例如亚历山大大帝，代奥克里贤；还有我们都记得的查理第五，以及其他的君王之所为是也。因为那一向惯于进取的人，在后来碰了钉子的时节，不免要自轻自贱，非复故我的。

to speak now of the true temper of empire: it is a thing rare, and hard to keep: for both temper and distemper consist of contraries. but it is one thing to mingle contraries, another to interchange them. the answer of apollonius to vespasian is full of excellent instruction;
现在且说王权底真气质；那是很不容易保持的；因为真的气质和失调的气质二者都是由矛盾冲突之物所成者也。然而搀和相反的事物为一事，交换相反的事物又为一事。阿波郎尼亚斯答外斯帕显的话是满含最好的教训的。
vespasian asked him; what was nero's overthrow? he answered;nero could touch and tune the harp well; but in government, sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, sometimes to let them down too low. and certain it is, that nothing destroyeth authority so much, as the unequal and untimely interchange of power pressed too far, and relaxed too much.
外斯帕显问他：“招致尼罗底颠覆者是什么”？他答道：“尼罗善于调弦弄琴；可是在政治上，他把轴栓有时拧得太紧，有时放得太松了”。无疑地，忽然大施威迫，忽然过度松弛，这种不平衡不合时的政策之变换，再没有比它更能破坏威权的了。

this is true; that the wisdom of all these latter times in princes' affairs, is rather fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers and mischiefs, when they are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep them aloof. but this is but to try masteries with fortune: and let men beware, how they neglect, and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared: for no man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may come.
近代的讲人君之事者，其智多在巧避与转移临近的危难，而不在坚固合理的，使人君超然危难之上的常轨，这是真的。但是这种办法简直是与幸运之神争短长了。人们也应当小心，不可忽视或容忍变乱底资料之渐积，因为没有人能防止那星星之火，也没有人能够看出这火星子将从何方来也。
the difficulties in princes' business are many and great; but the greatest difficulty, is often in their own mind. for it is common with princes (saith tacitus) to will contradictories. sunt plerumque.'region voluntates vehementes et inter se contrariae. for it is the solecism of power, to think to command the end, and yet not to endure the mean.
人君事业中的艰难是多而且大的；然而其最大的艰难却常是在他们自己心里的。因为（如泰西塔斯所说）作帝王的人而有矛盾的欲望乃是常事也：“君王们底欲望多是强烈而又自相矛盾的”。盖权势底自然弱点就是想要达到某种目的而却不肯忍受那必需的手段也。

kings have to deal with their neighbours; their wives; their children; their prelates or clergy; their nobles; their second-nobles or gentlemen; their merchants; their commons; and their men of war, and from all these arise dangers, if care and circumspection be not used.
为帝王者必须应付其邻国，后妃，子女，高级僧侣或教士，贵族，第二流的贵族或绅士，商人，平民，兵士；从所有的这些方面都可以兴起危难，假如他不小心谨慎的话。
first for their neighbours; there can no general rule be given (the occasions are so variable), save one; which ever holdeth; which is, that princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbours do overgrow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them, than they were. and this is, generally, the work of standing councils to foresee, and to hinder it during that triumvirate of kings. king henry vffl of england, francis i, king of france, and charles v, emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war: and would not, in any wise, take up peace at interest and the like was done by that league (which, guicciardine saith, was the security of italy) made between ferdinando king of naples; lorenzius medices, and ludovicus sforza, potentates, the one of florence, the other of milan.
先说他们底邻国。关于这点除了一条永远可靠的定理外别无普遍的定理可说，因为情势是十分易于变化的。那一条永远可靠的定理就是为人君者应当监视不懈，毋使任何邻国（或以领土之扩张，或由商业之吸引，或用外交的手腕，以及类此的种种）强大到比以先更能为患于本国的程度。要预料并防止这种情形是政府中某项永久机关底工作。在从前三大君主——就是英王亨利第八，法王法兰西斯第一，皇帝查理第五——为欧洲领袖的时候，他们三位之中谁不能得尺寸之土，若果有一位得着了尺寸之土，其余的两位立刻就要把那种情形纠正过来，其方法或以联盟，或以战争（如果必要的话），并且无论如何决不贪一时之利而与之讲和，其互相监视之严有如此者。又奈波尔斯王飞迭南，劳伦斯·麦地奇与卢道维喀斯·斯福尔察（二人都是霸君，一个是佛罗伦斯底，一个是米兰底）之间的那个联盟（即贵恰底尼所谓意大利之保障者）其所为亦与此相同。

neither is the opinion of some of the schoolmen to be received; that a war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent injury, or provocation. for there is no question, but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.
还有经院学派中某种学者底意见，以为无已成的伤害或挑衅的原因而作战，不能算是堂堂正正之师，这种意见是要不得的。因为敌人虽尚未给我们以打击，但是我们有充分的理由恐惧临近的祸患，这也算是战争底正当原因，这是没有问题的。
for their wives; there are cruel examples of them. livia is enfamed for the poisoning of her husband: roxolana, solyman's wife, was the destruction of that renowned prince. sultan mustapha; and otherwise troubled his house, and succession: edward the second of england his queen had the principal hand, in the deposing and murder of her husband.
至于后妃，她们之中是有残酷的例子的。里维亚因为毒害丈夫而著恶名；罗克撒拉那，梭利满底王后，就是杀害那位出名的王子苏丹穆斯塔发的人，并且在别的方面也曾搅乱其家庭及嗣续；英王爱德华第二底王后在废除并杀害她底丈夫之举中是主要人物。

this kind of danger is then to be feared, chiefly, when the wives have plots for the raising of their own children; or else that they be adulteresses.
因此，最当防范这种危险的时候，就是当那为后妃者为了要扶立自己底所生而有阴谋的时候，否则就是当她们有外遇的时候。
for their children: the tragedies, likewise, of dangers from them, have been many.
至于子嗣，同样地，由他们而来的危难其所致的不幸也是很多的。
and generally, the entering of fathers into suspicion of their children, hath been ever unfortunate. the destruction of mustapha (that we named before) was so fatal to solyman's line, as the succession of the turks, from solyman, until this day, is suspected to be untrue, and of strange blood; for mat selymus the second was thought to be supposititious. the destruction of crispus, a young prince of rare towardness, by constantinus the great, his father, was in like manner fatal to his house; for both constantinus, and constance, his sons, died violent deaths; and constantius, his other son, did little better; who died, indeed, of sickness, but after that julianus had taken arms against him. the destruction of demetrius, son to philip the second, of macedonia, turned upon the father, who died of repentance. and many like examples there are: but few, or none, where the fathers had good by such distrust; except it were, where me sons were up in open arms against them; as was selymus the first against baiazet: and the three sons of henry the second, king of england.
一般地说来，父亲对儿子生疑忌之心者总是不幸的。穆斯塔发之死（上面已经说到的）对梭利满王室是一种致命伤，因为土耳其王室自梭利满以至今日的王位继承都有不正之嫌疑，恐是外来的血统；因为塞利马斯第二被人认为是私生子也。克瑞斯帕斯（一位非常温顺的青年王子）之见杀于康士坦丁努斯大帝，也同样地是他那个王室底致命伤；因为康士坦丁努斯底两个儿子，康士坦丁努斯和康士坦斯，都死于非命；他底另外的一个儿子，康士坦洽斯，结局也不见佳；他虽然确是病死的，但是他也是在玖利安努斯起兵之后死的。马其顿王腓力普第二底王子德米垂亚斯之死报在他父亲身上，因为他是悔恨而死的。类此的例子很多，但是为父亲的因这种猜疑之心而得到益处的例子却是很少或没有；唯有在做儿子的公然举兵反叛的时候，那可算是例外，如塞利马斯第一之征巴亚塞提，和英王亨利第二之三子是也。

for their prelates; when they are proud and great, there is also danger from them: as it was, in the times of anselmus, and thomas becket, archbishops of canterbury; who with their croziers, did almost try it, with the king's sword; and yet they had to deal with stout and haughty kings; william rufus, henry the first, and henry the second. the danger is not from that state, but where it hath a dependence of foreign authority; or where the churchmen come in, and are elected, not by the collation of the king, or particular patrons, but by the people.
至于高级僧侣，在他们骄纵有势的时候，也可以由他们发生危险的，如安塞尔马斯和坎特白雷大主教汤玛斯·拜开提底时代尤是也。这两个人几乎以他们底圭杖与帝王底刀剑相争，而奇者，他们所与之抗衡者竟是坚强骄傲的君主，即威廉·鲁夫斯，亨利第一与亨利第二是也。这种危险并非来自僧侣阶级底本身，而是当他们倚仗国外的势力的时候才有的，或者在僧侣们进来及被选的时候，不受职于君主或任何个人而是由民众选出的，在这种时候，才有危险的。

for their nobles; to keep them at a distance, it is not amiss; but to depress them, may make a king more absolute, but less safe; and less able to perform anything that he desires. i have noted it, in my history of king henry the seventh of england, who depressed his nobility; whereupon, it came to pass that his times were full of difficulties, and troubles; for the nobility, though they continued loyal unto him, yet did they not cooperate with him in his business. so that in effect, he was fain to do all things, himself.
至于贵族，对他们稍为疏远也不为过；可是压抑他们，也许可以使为帝王者君权更专，但是不甚安全，并且不容易把他心中所欲的事做到。在拙著《英王亨利第七本纪》中常见及此点，即亨利第七是压抑贵族的，因此他底时代乃是充满着艰难与祸乱的；因为那些贵族，虽然仍旧忠于亨利，然而却没有在他底事业上与他合作。因此他就不得不自己来办一切的事了。

for their second nobles; there is not much danger from them, being a body dispersed. they may sometimes discourse high, but that doth little hurt: besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher nobility, that they grow not too potent: and lastly, being the most immediate in authority, with the common people, they do best temper popular commotions.
至于那第二流的贵族，他们是没有什么危险性的，因为他们是一个散漫的团体。他们有时候也许放言高论，但是那是没有什么大害的；并且，他们是高级贵族底一种平衡力，使之不能增长得过于强大的；最后，他们因为是最与一般人民接近的掌权者，所以他们也是最能缓和民乱的。
for their merchants; they are venaporta; and if they flourish not, a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish lime. taxes, and imposts upon them, do seldom good to the king's revenue; for that that he wins in the hundred, he loseth in the shire; the particular rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading rather decreased.
至于商人，他们可算是“门静脉”；要是他们不繁荣，那末一个国家也许有好的四肢，但是其血管将是空的，其营养将甚为贫乏。加之于他们的赋税很少能于人君底收入有益的，因为他在小处得来的在大处失去了，那就是各项税率固然增加，而商业底总额则减削也。

for their commons; there is little danger from them, except it be, where they have great and potent heads; or where you meddle with the point of religion; or their customs, or means of life.
至于平民，除非他们有伟大，多能的领袖，或者你对于宗教问题，或他们底风俗，或他们底生计加以干涉的时候，他们是没有什么危险性的。
for their men of war, it is a dangerous state, where they live and remain in a body, and are used to donatives; whereof we see examples in the janissaries, and pretorian bands of rome: but trainings of men, and arming them in several places, and under several commanders, and without donatives, are things of defence, and no danger.
至于军人，当他们在一起过着团体生活，并且习于赏赐的时候，他们是一个危险阶级。如此的例子我们可于土耳其之亲卫兵与罗马之护卫军见之；但是训练一部分人，并分级予以武装，由好几个将帅统领，并且不加赏赐，则是自卫的举措而不含危险也。

princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times;and which have much veneration, but no rest all precepts concerming kings, are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances: memento quod es homo', and memento quod es deus, or vice da', the one bridleth their power, and the other their will.
为人君者有如天上的星宿，能致福亦能致祸，受很多的尊敬但是没有休息。一切关于帝王的箴言，实际是包含在这两句铭语里的；“记住你是个人”和“记住你是个神或者神底代表”。头一句话约束他们底权力，后一句话控制他们底意志。

培根散文随笔集中英对照，通过阅读文学名著学语言，是掌握英语的绝佳方法。既可接触原汁原味的英语，又能享受文学之美，一举两得，何乐不为？
19 of empire 论王权
所欲者甚少而所畏者甚多，这种心理是一种痛苦可怜的心理；然而为帝王者其情形多是如此。他们因为尊贵已极，所以没有什么可希冀的，这就使得他们底精神萎靡不振；同时他们又有许多关于危难暗祸的想象，这又使他们底心智不宁了

这也就是《圣经》中所谓“君心难测”的那种情形底原因之一。因为畏忌多端而没有一宗主要的欲望可以指挥并约束其余的欲望，这种心理会使得任何人底心都是难以测度也。因此有许多君王常为自己造欲望，并专心于细事；这些细事有时是一座建筑，有时是建立一个教宗，有时是擢升一人，有时是要专精一艺或一技，如尼罗之于琴，道密先之于射，可谟达斯之于剑，卡剌卡拉之于御，以及类此者皆是也。这对于那些不知道下列的原理的人好象是不可思议的，那原理就是人底心理乐于在小事上得益，而不乐于在大事上滞留。我们也常见那些在早年曾为幸运的胜利者的帝王，因为他们不能永远进取，而在幸运中不得不受限制的原故，在晚年变为迷信而且寡欢；例如亚历山大大帝，代奥克里贤；还有我们都记得的查理第五，以及其他的君王之所为是也。因为那一向惯于进取的人，在后来碰了钉子的时节，不免要自轻自贱，非复故我的。

现在且说王权底真气质；那是很不容易保持的；因为真的气质和失调的气质二者都是由矛盾冲突之物所成者也。然而搀和相反的事物为一事，交换相反的事物又为一事。阿波郎尼亚斯答外斯帕显的话是满含最好的教训的。
外斯帕显问他：“招致尼罗底颠覆者是什么”？他答道：“尼罗善于调弦弄琴；可是在政治上，他把轴栓有时拧得太紧，有时放得太松了”。无疑地，忽然大施威迫，忽然过度松弛，这种不平衡不合时的政策之变换，再没有比它更能破坏威权的了。

近代的讲人君之事者，其智多在巧避与转移临近的危难，而不在坚固合理的，使人君超然危难之上的常轨，这是真的。但是这种办法简直是与幸运之神争短长了。人们也应当小心，不可忽视或容忍变乱底资料之渐积，因为没有人能防止那星星之火，也没有人能够看出这火星子将从何方来也。
人君事业中的艰难是多而且大的；然而其最大的艰难却常是在他们自己心里的。因为（如泰西塔斯所说）作帝王的人而有矛盾的欲望乃是常事也：“君王们底欲望多是强烈而又自相矛盾的”。盖权势底自然弱点就是想要达到某种目的而却不肯忍受那必需的手段也。

为帝王者必须应付其邻国，后妃，子女，高级僧侣或教士，贵族，第二流的贵族或绅士，商人，平民，兵士；从所有的这些方面都可以兴起危难，假如他不小心谨慎的话。
先说他们底邻国。关于这点除了一条永远可靠的定理外别无普遍的定理可说，因为情势是十分易于变化的。那一条永远可靠的定理就是为人君者应当监视不懈，毋使任何邻国（或以领土之扩张，或由商业之吸引，或用外交的手腕，以及类此的种种）强大到比以先更能为患于本国的程度。要预料并防止这种情形是政府中某项永久机关底工作。在从前三大君主——就是英王亨利第八，法王法兰西斯第一，皇帝查理第五——为欧洲领袖的时候，他们三位之中谁不能得尺寸之土，若果有一位得着了尺寸之土，其余的两位立刻就要把那种情形纠正过来，其方法或以联盟，或以战争（如果必要的话），并且无论如何决不贪一时之利而与之讲和，其互相监视之严有如此者。又奈波尔斯王飞迭南，劳伦斯·麦地奇与卢道维喀斯·斯福尔察（二人都是霸君，一个是佛罗伦斯底，一个是米兰底）之间的那个联盟（即贵恰底尼所谓意大利之保障者）其所为亦与此相同。

还有经院学派中某种学者底意见，以为无已成的伤害或挑衅的原因而作战，不能算是堂堂正正之师，这种意见是要不得的。因为敌人虽尚未给我们以打击，但是我们有充分的理由恐惧临近的祸患，这也算是战争底正当原因，这是没有问题的。
至于后妃，她们之中是有残酷的例子的。里维亚因为毒害丈夫而著恶名；罗克撒拉那，梭利满底王后，就是杀害那位出名的王子苏丹穆斯塔发的人，并且在别的方面也曾搅乱其家庭及嗣续；英王爱德华第二底王后在废除并杀害她底丈夫之举中是主要人物。

因此，最当防范这种危险的时候，就是当那为后妃者为了要扶立自己底所生而有阴谋的时候，否则就是当她们有外遇的时候。
至于子嗣，同样地，由他们而来的危难其所致的不幸也是很多的。
一般地说来，父亲对儿子生疑忌之心者总是不幸的。穆斯塔发之死（上面已经说到的）对梭利满王室是一种致命伤，因为土耳其王室自梭利满以至今日的王位继承都有不正之嫌疑，恐是外来的血统；因为塞利马斯第二被人认为是私生子也。克瑞斯帕斯（一位非常温顺的青年王子）之见杀于康士坦丁努斯大帝，也同样地是他那个王室底致命伤；因为康士坦丁努斯底两个儿子，康士坦丁努斯和康士坦斯，都死于非命；他底另外的一个儿子，康士坦洽斯，结局也不见佳；他虽然确是病死的，但是他也是在玖利安努斯起兵之后死的。马其顿王腓力普第二底王子德米垂亚斯之死报在他父亲身上，因为他是悔恨而死的。类此的例子很多，但是为父亲的因这种猜疑之心而得到益处的例子却是很少或没有；唯有在做儿子的公然举兵反叛的时候，那可算是例外，如塞利马斯第一之征巴亚塞提，和英王亨利第二之三子是也。

至于高级僧侣，在他们骄纵有势的时候，也可以由他们发生危险的，如安塞尔马斯和坎特白雷大主教汤玛斯·拜开提底时代尤是也。这两个人几乎以他们底圭杖与帝王底刀剑相争，而奇者，他们所与之抗衡者竟是坚强骄傲的君主，即威廉·鲁夫斯，亨利第一与亨利第二是也。这种危险并非来自僧侣阶级底本身，而是当他们倚仗国外的势力的时候才有的，或者在僧侣们进来及被选的时候，不受职于君主或任何个人而是由民众选出的，在这种时候，才有危险的。

至于贵族，对他们稍为疏远也不为过；可是压抑他们，也许可以使为帝王者君权更专，但是不甚安全，并且不容易把他心中所欲的事做到。在拙著《英王亨利第七本纪》中常见及此点，即亨利第七是压抑贵族的，因此他底时代乃是充满着艰难与祸乱的；因为那些贵族，虽然仍旧忠于亨利，然而却没有在他底事业上与他合作。因此他就不得不自己来办一切的事了。

至于那第二流的贵族，他们是没有什么危险性的，因为他们是一个散漫的团体。他们有时候也许放言高论，但是那是没有什么大害的；并且，他们是高级贵族底一种平衡力，使之不能增长得过于强大的；最后，他们因为是最与一般人民接近的掌权者，所以他们也是最能缓和民乱的。
至于商人，他们可算是“门静脉”；要是他们不繁荣，那末一个国家也许有好的四肢，但是其血管将是空的，其营养将甚为贫乏。加之于他们的赋税很少能于人君底收入有益的，因为他在小处得来的在大处失去了，那就是各项税率固然增加，而商业底总额则减削也。

至于平民，除非他们有伟大，多能的领袖，或者你对于宗教问题，或他们底风俗，或他们底生计加以干涉的时候，他们是没有什么危险性的。
至于军人，当他们在一起过着团体生活，并且习于赏赐的时候，他们是一个危险阶级。如此的例子我们可于土耳其之亲卫兵与罗马之护卫军见之；但是训练一部分人，并分级予以武装，由好几个将帅统领，并且不加赏赐，则是自卫的举措而不含危险也。

为人君者有如天上的星宿，能致福亦能致祸，受很多的尊敬但是没有休息。一切关于帝王的箴言，实际是包含在这两句铭语里的；“记住你是个人”和“记住你是个神或者神底代表”。头一句话约束他们底权力，后一句话控制他们底意志。

it is a miserable state of mind, to have few things to desire, and many things to fear: and yet that commonly is the case of kings; who being at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes their minds more languishing; and have many representations of perils and shadows, which makes their minds the less clear.
and this is one reason also of that effect, which the scripture speaketh of; that the king's heart is inscrutable. for multitude of jealousies, and lack of some predominant desire, that should marshal and put in order all the rest, maketh any man's heart hard to find, or sound. hence it comes likewise, that princes, many times, make themselves desires, and set their hearts upon toys: sometimes upon a building; sometimes upon erecting of an order, sometimes upon the advancing of a person; sometimes upon obtaining excellency in some art, or feat of the hand; as nero for playing on the harp, domitian for certainty of the hand with the arrow, commodus for playing at fence, caracalla for driving chariots, and the like. this seemeth incredible unto those that know not the principle; that the mind of man is more cheered, and refreshed, by profiting in small things, than by standing at a stay in great we see also that kings, that have been fortunate conquerors in their first years; it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely, but that they must have some check or arrest in their fortunes; turn in their latter years to be superstitious and melancholy: as did alexander the great;dioclesian; and in our memory, charles the fifth; and others: for he that is used go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favour, and is not the thing he was.
to speak now of the true temper of empire: it is a thing rare, and hard to keep: for both temper and distemper consist of contraries. but it is one thing to mingle contraries, another to interchange them. the answer of apollonius to vespasian is full of excellent instruction;
vespasian asked him; what was nero's overthrow? he answered;nero could touch and tune the harp well; but in government, sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, sometimes to let them down too low. and certain it is, that nothing destroyeth authority so much, as the unequal and untimely interchange of power pressed too far, and relaxed too much.
this is true; that the wisdom of all these latter times in princes' affairs, is rather fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers and mischiefs, when they are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep them aloof. but this is but to try masteries with fortune: and let men beware, how they neglect, and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared: for no man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may come.
the difficulties in princes' business are many and great; but the greatest difficulty, is often in their own mind. for it is common with princes (saith tacitus) to will contradictories. sunt plerumque.'region voluntates vehementes et inter se contrariae. for it is the solecism of power, to think to command the end, and yet not to endure the mean.
kings have to deal with their neighbours; their wives; their children; their prelates or clergy; their nobles; their second-nobles or gentlemen; their merchants; their commons; and their men of war, and from all these arise dangers, if care and circumspection be not used.
first for their neighbours; there can no general rule be given (the occasions are so variable), save one; which ever holdeth; which is, that princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbours do overgrow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them, than they were. and this is, generally, the work of standing councils to foresee, and to hinder it during that triumvirate of kings. king henry vffl of england, francis i, king of france, and charles v, emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war: and would not, in any wise, take up peace at interest and the like was done by that league (which, guicciardine saith, was the security of italy) made between ferdinando king of naples; lorenzius medices, and ludovicus sforza, potentates, the one of florence, the other of milan.
neither is the opinion of some of the schoolmen to be received; that a war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent injury, or provocation. for there is no question, but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.
for their wives; there are cruel examples of them. livia is enfamed for the poisoning of her husband: roxolana, solyman's wife, was the destruction of that renowned prince. sultan mustapha; and otherwise troubled his house, and succession: edward the second of england his queen had the principal hand, in the deposing and murder of her husband.
this kind of danger is then to be feared, chiefly, when the wives have plots for the raising of their own children; or else that they be adulteresses.
for their children: the tragedies, likewise, of dangers from them, have been many.
and generally, the entering of fathers into suspicion of their children, hath been ever unfortunate. the destruction of mustapha (that we named before) was so fatal to solyman's line, as the succession of the turks, from solyman, until this day, is suspected to be untrue, and of strange blood; for mat selymus the second was thought to be supposititious. the destruction of crispus, a young prince of rare towardness, by constantinus the great, his father, was in like manner fatal to his house; for both constantinus, and constance, his sons, died violent deaths; and constantius, his other son, did little better; who died, indeed, of sickness, but after that julianus had taken arms against him. the destruction of demetrius, son to philip the second, of macedonia, turned upon the father, who died of repentance. and many like examples there are: but few, or none, where the fathers had good by such distrust; except it were, where me sons were up in open arms against them; as was selymus the first against baiazet: and the three sons of henry the second, king of england.
for their prelates; when they are proud and great, there is also danger from them: as it was, in the times of anselmus, and thomas becket, archbishops of canterbury; who with their croziers, did almost try it, with the king's sword; and yet they had to deal with stout and haughty kings; william rufus, henry the first, and henry the second. the danger is not from that state, but where it hath a dependence of foreign authority; or where the churchmen come in, and are elected, not by the collation of the king, or particular patrons, but by the people.
for their nobles; to keep them at a distance, it is not amiss; but to depress them, may make a king more absolute, but less safe; and less able to perform anything that he desires. i have noted it, in my history of king henry the seventh of england, who depressed his nobility; whereupon, it came to pass that his times were full of difficulties, and troubles; for the nobility, though they continued loyal unto him, yet did they not cooperate with him in his business. so that in effect, he was fain to do all things, himself.
for their second nobles; there is not much danger from them, being a body dispersed. they may sometimes discourse high, but that doth little hurt: besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher nobility, that they grow not too potent: and lastly, being the most immediate in authority, with the common people, they do best temper popular commotions.
for their merchants; they are venaporta; and if they flourish not, a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish lime. taxes, and imposts upon them, do seldom good to the king's revenue; for that that he wins in the hundred, he loseth in the shire; the particular rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading rather decreased.
for their commons; there is little danger from them, except it be, where they have great and potent heads; or where you meddle with the point of religion; or their customs, or means of life.
for their men of war, it is a dangerous state, where they live and remain in a body, and are used to donatives; whereof we see examples in the janissaries, and pretorian bands of rome: but trainings of men, and arming them in several places, and under several commanders, and without donatives, are things of defence, and no danger.
princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times;and which have much veneration, but no rest all precepts concerming kings, are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances: memento quod es homo', and memento quod es deus, or vice da', the one bridleth their power, and the other their will.